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from abroad is the major problem of those who seek to reconstruct
their societies through systems of "social engineering." If Asians
and Africans associate the protection of the individual only with
the legal system of their former colonial masters, there can be
little- hope for the preservation of humanistic concepts after in-
dependence. However, if the former colonials appreciate, as is us-
ually the case, that in their own traditional social order there is a
philosophy of respect for the individual, they are far more likely
to borrow from abroad or even to preserve some of the features
implanted by the colonial power, because these features can be
used to achieve the traditional ends of an African or an Asian so-
ciety.
Perhaps this is where the Human Rights Commission of the
United Nations has a role to play. In spite of disappointments
among many over its lack of accomplishment, the Commission has
at least demonstrated that men of all races and geographical re-
gions have some common aspirations. Implementation of these
aspirations will take time, but it will be hastened if foreign in-
stitutions are considered useful tools for implementing indigenous
cultural values rather than carriers of hostile forces from abroad.
Franck set out to prove that there is a unity in legal culture
throughout the common law world, and that there is an interaction
between legal systems tending to enhance that unity. On balance he
has achieved that purpose in a thought-provoking study which
should be read by every public lawyer concerned with develop-
ment.
JOHN N. HAZARD*
WHY FEDERATIONS FAIL: AN INQUIRY INTO THE REQ-
UISITES FOR' SUCCESSFUL FEDERALISM. Edited by
Thomas M. Franck. New York: New York University Press,
1968. Pp. xv, 213. $7.50.
In his introduction to this volume Frank N. Trager, Professor
of International Affairs at New York University, asserts:
What we mean by federalism is not a fixed point on a
map, but a tendency which is neither unitary nor separat-
ist. . . . A federalized state is one in which the several
units and their respective powers are constitutionally or
otherwise legally united under the ultimate power of a
*Professor of Public Law, Columbia University School of Law.
central state and government. But it is also an essential
mark of a federalized state that the subordinate units re-
tain or have reserved some irreducible powers operative
within the same territory and regulating the same popula-
tion over which the federal authority also applies with
respect to other matters or different aspects of the same
matter.'
He notes that governments controlling over half the land mass of
the world can with some justification claim a federal structure. 2
Studies of abortive efforts to establish or maintain such unions in
East and Central Africa, the West Indies, and Malaysia form the
body of the book.
Thomas M. Franck, Professor of Law at New York University,
seeks to explain the failure of Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and
Zanzibar to federate following their independence in the early years
of the present decade. He notes:
If ever the right political galaxies appeared to be in pro-
pitious conjunction, it was in East Africa in the summer
of 1963. Here four nations. . . come of age with historic,
functional, political and personal ties so strong that their
failure to seize the moment seems, at first glance, almost
a flouting of destiny.3
The states, formerly British dependencies, share a heritage of
English language and law. They retain the super structure of in-
terterritorial government, substantial economic integration, and
jointly administered communication and transportation services.4
Their borders cut across topographic, economic, and ethnographic
regions. Although Tanganyika and Zanzibar have merged to form
Tanzania, further coalescence has been resisted despite these seem-
ingly dispositive cohesive forces. Franck attributes continuing
autonomy to self-seeking by national leaders:
It is, in fact, a near-classic example of political wreck-
ing: of personal ambitions and ego triumphant over the
logic of history. In place of a great federation a handful
of politicians created, instead, an illusion of identity be-
t veen the national interest and their personal ambitions.
1. WHY FEDERATIONS FAIL: AN INQUIRY INTO THE REQUISITES FOR SUC-
CESSFUL FEDETALiSm at x-xi (T. Franck ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
FEDERATIONS].
2. W. RIKER, FEDERALISm: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE (1964).
3. FEDERATIONS 3.
4. For a detailed review of efforts toward East African economic and po-
litical integration, see Comment, Economic Integration in East Africa:
The East African Treaty for Co-operation, supra at 302.
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As a class, and with important exceptions, nouveau
puissant behaved exactly like nouveau riche in the osten-
tatious display and excessive protection of their new re-
source.5
In 1953 Britain created the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa-
land, an amalgamation of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia and
the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. At the end
of 1963 this union was dissolved: Nyasaland and Northern Rho-
desia became the independent states of Malawi and Zambia in 1964,
while Southern Rhodesia unilaterally repudiated her colonial status
in 1965. Herbert J. Spiro, Professor of Political Science at the
University of Pennsylvania, correctly attributes the failure of the
Federation to inability to resolve problems of race relations in-
herent in its structure and goals. Control was vested at formation
in a rapidly expanding European minority of fewer than 200,000
persons, while an indigenous population in excess of six million
was left almost unrepresented. In the thirty-five-member joint as-
sembly six seats were reserved for Africans and three seats pro-
vided for Europeans defending native interests; "of the Africans,
two were elected from Southern Rhodesia by an electorate 98 per
cent white, and two each from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland
-were appointed by the governors." 6 Subsequent modification of the
structure of the legislature did not significantly alter the discrim-
inatory pattern. The resulting partnership between the races has
been compared to that between a horse and its rider. Possibilities
of meaningful reform were so restricted that even semantic rem-
edies appeared attractive: "The opposition to Federation . . . has
indeed become so strong that . . . retention of the name 'Fed-
eration' which has become a hated word and is associated. . . with
a policy of white domination, will cause opposition to linger on ...
It should be changed." 7 As Professor Spiro notes, internal liberal-
ization sponsored by Britain in the two northern territories even-
tually increased political contradictions in the federal structure be-
yond the point of toleration.
Gisbert H. Flanz, Professor of Political Science at New York
University, comments on the West Indian Federation, a union of
Jamaica, Trinidad, and smaller Caribbean islands formed in 1958
5. FEDERATIONS 3-4.
6. Chitepo, Developments in Central Africa, in FEDERALISM AND THE NEw
NATIONS OF AFRICA 3, 8 (D. Currie ed. 1964).
7. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND, REPORT, CMND. No. 1148, at
16, 21 (1960).
but abandoned three years later. Here commitment to combination
appears never to have exceeded enlightened apathy: the weakness
of the federal government was revealed by its assertion in 1961 that
taxation of incomes and efforts to promote industrial development
should be postponed to avoid hampering or endangering territorial
economies. The author concludes:
[M] ost of the leading personalities of the West Indies
Federation. . . never came sufficiently to grips with the
economic realities. Their entire approach was excessively
petty-political. Well-preserved insularity and economic
self-interest . . . were the stuff of which the Federal
Constitution was made, and in this it correctly foretold its
own failure.8
The Federation of Malaysia was created in 1963 by integration
of the Federation of Malaya, an eleven-state combination formed in
1948, with the adjacent commercial and industrial island of Sin-
gapore and the less populous territories of Sabah and Sarawak.
Expulsion of Singapore from the union in 1965 has reduced what
appeared a potentially prosperous amalgamation to two economi-
cally complementary states of doubtful autonomous viability. Pro-
fessor Trager carefully reviews the reasons for incompatibility,
stressing the inevitability of conflict between the conservative in-
digenous Malay Muslims and the aggressive secular Chinese com-
munity, dominant in Singapore but constituting a substantial mi-
nority elsewhere.
In his conclusion Professor Franck offers a tripartite catalogue
of factors promoting federation and goals which those supporting
it hope to achieve. Perhaps tautologically, an overriding political or
ideological commitment to union as an end in itself is felt pre-
requisite to success. He classifies as secondary those elements, for
example a common language or the prospect of gain through eco-
nomic cooperation, believed important yet presumed insufficient
alone to assure a continuing relationship. Such tertiary consider-
ations as a need for ethnic balance or the hope of earlier inde-
pendence from foreign rule are thought useful in motivating com-
binations but likely to prove disintegrative unless complemented or
replaced by more durable stimuli.
An alternative analysis would appear more rewarding. There is
less need to explain the frustration of presupposed propensities to-
ward federation than to isolate those forces capable of overcom-
ing the inertia inherent in autonomy. Professors Franck and Flanz
8. FEDERATIONS 115-16.
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unrealistically attack national leaders for their unwillingness to
sacrifice personal power to promote unification. Their criticism re-
quires the premise, essentially unarticulated, that coalescence will
prove beneficial to the populations of the states involved. On purely
political grounds such an assumption would appear unwarranted:
the fate of Nigeria, an experiment in federalism under British
auspices like the four cases studied, illustrates the dangers of overly
ambitious integration.
The economic consequences of unification seem to play a more
central role than the authors indicate. The problem of inadequate
internal markets currently confronts almost all developing coun-
tries: among those outside the Communist bloc, gross national
product exceeds seven billion dollars only in the already federated
states of India, Brazil, Mexico, and Pakistan. Over ninety of the
underdeveloped nations have populations below fifteen million; more
than sixty have fewer than five million people. Inability to achieve
industrial economies of scale would hinder growth even in a rela-
tively wealthy state of fifteen million.9
Professor Franck states that "the most impressive gains of the
Central African Federation were economic" "I and that in East
Africa "shared experience of economic cooperation was not enough
to hold the common market together, let alone serve as a base for
federation." 11 From failure in the African cases he concludes that
economic incentives cannot adequately motivate coalescence. That
union may facilitate development of the integrated region as an
entity does not, however, dispose of the issue faced by an individual
state of the advisability of joining a prospective combination or of
continuing participation in a functioning amalgamation: benefit to
member nations as a group will most likely be viewed by all as
profitable only if gains are so distributed that the position of each
is superior to that probable in isolation.
Closer association among Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda has
been impeded because Kenya, the industrial center of East Africa,
has profited from regional economic ties at the expense of its
neighbors. Tanzania has probably suffered a net loss from integra-
tion.12 In Central Africa gain was also unevenly divided. In the
9. See B. BALASSA, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION 80 (1965);
S. DELL, A LATIN AMERICAN COMMON MARKET? at v (1966); Robinson,
Introduction to ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE SIZE OF NATIONS at
xviii (E. Robinson ed. 1960).
10. FEDERATIONS 176.
11. Id.
12. See P. NDEGWA, THE COMMON MARKET AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AF-
RICA 136 (1965); B. Massell, The Distribution of Gains in a Common
three years immediately preceding union the money economies of
Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia expanded fifty-eight and thirty-
seven per cent; in the interval from 1954 to 1957 growth was
thirty-five and forty-seven per cent respectively. The bulk of fed-
eral revenue, raised primarily through taxation of copper produc-
tion in Northern Rhodesia, was expended in Southern Rhodesia
rather than in impoverished Nyasaland. Hazlewood and Henderson
state: "There can be few if any federations elsewhere in which a
distinctive and conspicuously poorer region, containing over one-
third of the population, would receive so small a share of public
funds." 13 Here, however, economic inequalities merely aggravated
independently insuperable racial difficulties.
Surveying the dialogue concerning union in Jamaica in 1961,
Professor Franck notes:
"[B] oth parties failed to put the important political con-
cepts of Federation and separatism" before the electorate.
The debate took place entirely in narrow terms of eco-
nomic self-interest, which made it both inconclusive and
certainly uninspiring to the average voter, rather than in
terms of commitment to a federal ideology. No doubt
there were those whose thoughts were of a manifest des-
tiny, of pan-Caribbeanism, of the challenge to be big and
great. But the politicians only challenged the voters to
decide whether federation would cut administrative over-
head and whether Trinidad or Jamaica would glean the
benefits of new markets in the smaller islands.14
In this case attention was probably focused on the most important
issues; federation seems to have failed primarily because potential
economic benefit was insufficient to overcome a desire for political
independence. Visions of a West Indian Reich are at best paranoid.
ROBERT L. BIRMINGHAM*
Market: The East African Case 13 (Rand Corporation Paper P-2956,
Aug. 1964); Due & Robson, Taz Harmonization in the East African Com-
mon Market, in 2 FIScAL HARMONIZATION IN COMMON MARKETS 553, 590,
591, 592 (C. Shoup ed. 1967).
13. A. HAZLMEWOOD & P. HENDERSON, NYASALAND: THE ECONOMICS OF FED-
ERATION 58 (1960). See 1963 FEDERATION OF RHODESIA & NYASALAND
ECON. REP. 21.
14. FEDERATIONS 179.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law
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